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Burke argued the mitigating factors surrounding his offense made
debarment unnecessary, as he did not represent a business risk, and
these mitigating factors made his five-year debarment period excessive.
Burke maintained his offense was a single act and not a pattern of
offenses, making him less of a business risk in future relationships.
The court explained that the scope of its review was to decide whether
the EPA acted reasonably given the facts in the record, and that the
EPA had discretion in making its decision. The court held, given the
nature and circumstances of Burke's offense, that EPA's decision to
debar him for five years was not an abuse of discretion.
PatrickNackley
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 237 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding section 509(b) (1) of the Clean Water Act determines venue,
notjurisdiction).
In April 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
promulgated regulations, known as the "Cluster Rules," pertaining to
the paper mill and pulp industry. The Cluster Rules include both
effluent limitation guidelines under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and
Several
emission standards under the Clean Air Act ("CAA").
environmental groups, including the National Wildlife Federation
(collectively, "NWF"), filed a petition for review of the CWA portion of
the Cluster Rules in the Ninth Circuit. Various paper producers
(collectively, "Industry petitioners") filed a petition for review of the
same portion of the Cluster Rules in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits.
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits transferred the Industry
petitioners to the Ninth Circuit, where the court consolidated their
petition for review with NWF's claims. Industry petitioners then
motioned to dismiss NWF's petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Without ruling, the Ninth Circuit transferred the case to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
CWA section 509(b) (1) provided the basis for the Industry
petitioner's lack of subject matter jurisdiction argument. This section
states that review of an administrator's action in promulgating any
effluent standard may be had in the "Circuit Court of Appeals of the
United States for the Federal judicial district in which such person
resides or transacts business which is directly affected by such action."
Industry petitioners argued the phrase "resides or transacts" was
jurisdictional and only one of the NWF petitioners resided or
transacted business in the Ninth Circuit. Industry petitioners asserted
that because NWF's one valid petitioner lost standing, or its claim
became moot, nine months after NWF's petition was filed, NWF's
remaining petition should be dismissed. NWF countered that the
"resides or transacts" language referred to venue, and argued venue
was properly established.
In analyzing Industry petitioners' and NWF's arguments, the court
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first looked to previous interpretations of similar language. In Texas
Municipal Power Agency v. EPA, the court noted it had previously
interpreted CAA's analogous provision as determining venue. In Texas
Municipal, the court held the mandatory language of the analogous
provision as to where a petitioner may "file" supported the conclusion
that the provision pertained to venue. The court noted the best
reading of "resides or transacts" language was as providing a choice
among circuits, and not the power of a specific circuit court to hear a
claim. Relying on this assertion and legislative history, the court
inferred the congressional purpose of the provision was to divide the
cases among the circuits.
The court next considered CWA section 509(b) (1) in light of its
decision in Texas Municipal. The court agreed that the language at
issue provided a choice among circuits and not the power of a
particular circuit to hear a claim. The court acknowledged that
section 509(b)(1) contained no exclusive language in contrast to the
language at issue in Texas Municipal In Texas Municipal, the relevant
CAA section stated a petition for review may be filed only in the
specified circuit. Here, such classifications were absent. Instead,
section 509(b)(1) expressly permitted "review of any enumerated
claim in whichever circuit an interested person resides or transacts
business."
Therefore, the court concluded section 509(b) (1)
determines venue, notjurisdiction
The court then considered the different remedies for improper
venue versus improper jurisdiction.
A claim brought in the
inappropriate jurisdiction is dismissed; a claim brought in the
inappropriate venue is transferred to the proper court. The court
reasoned that section 509(b) (1) evidences a broad grant of appellate
authority because every interested person challenging an enumerated
action has a court in which to obtain review. Interpreting section
509(b) (1) to pertain to venue comported better with this broad grant
of authority, as a simple transfer of the case to the proper court
preserves a petitioner's ability to obtain review. Accordingly, the court
held section 509(b) (1) must pertain to venue.
The court specifically addressed Industry petitioners' arguments
within the context of its previous statements. Industry petitioners
argued the court's rationale in Texas Municipal should not apply
because, in that case, CAA's provision limited the petitioner's ability to
challenge an agency's action in a particular court. Contrarily, Industry
petitioners asserted CWA limited a court's ability to review such a
petition.
The court described this argument as "exceptionally
unconvincing."
The court concluded section 509(b) (1) clearly
directed petitioners where to file, and neither explicitly addressed
courts nor used the term jurisdiction.
Industry petitioners next argued different courts have found other
provisions included in section 509(b) (1) pertained to jurisdiction.
The court determined this argument was contrary to its Texas
Municipal holding. In Texas Municipal, the court found the fact that
the CAA judicial review provision included jurisdictional restrictions
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was "not determinative" of whether or not the section pertained to
venue.
The court noted the CWA's legislative history was unclear and not
unequivocal as to whether section 509(b) (1) pertained to jurisdiction
or venue. However, Industry petitioners did not raise this argument.
The court concluded that even if they had, it would not have found
such an argument persuasive.
The court held section 509(b) (1) determines venue, not
jurisdiction. Because venue objections could be waived and Industry
petitioners conceded proper venue was no longer an issue, the court
denied Industry petitioners' motion to dismiss.
SarahE. McCutcheon
Slinger Drainage, Inc. v. EPA, 237 F.3d 681 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding
the provision of the Clean Water Act that establishes the computation
of time for filing a notice of appeal determines whether the notice is
timely and not the federal rules of procedure).
Slinger Drainage ("Slinger") installed drainage tiles over a fiftyacre area that resulted in the discharge of pollutants into a wetland.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") subsequently filed an
administrative complaint against Slinger alleging a violation of section
301 (a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for failure to obtain a permit
before discharging pollutant into a wetland. The Administrative Law
Judge found Slinger liable and imposed a civil penalty of $90,000. The
Appeals Board upheld the fine, and Slinger brought this action to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The court ruled it had no jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits
because Slinger failed to timely file the notice of appeal. Under the
CWA, Slinger had thirty days to file its notice of appeal beginning on
the date the Appeals Board issued its order. Slinger filed its notice a
day late under the CWA provision. Slinger argued the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure Rule 26(a) ("Rule 26(a)") governed how
courts should compute the thirty-day period, and not the CWA.
Under Rule 26(a), the day the court issued its order is not calculated
in the time period, and Slinger's appeal would have been filed on
time.
The court held Rule 26(a) did not apply when Congress has
specified a particular method of counting in the statute itself and there
is no indication of a contrary congressional intention. The court
dismissed Slinger's appeal because the CWA clearly established the
computation of time.
Spencer L. Sears
United States v. A.J.S., Inc., No. CIV.A.00-0263-C, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17388 (E.D. La. Nov. 29, 2000) (denying summary judgment
motion concerning a mortgage foreclosure due to the existence of

